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Many fraud detection problems involve large numbers of financial transactions such as 
those associated with credit cards, accounts receivables, payments to vendors, payrolls, or other 
expense accounts (Panigrahi 2006; Bolton and Hand 2002). Computer Assisted Auditing Tools 
and Techniques (CAATTs) e.g., ACL (2006) allow auditors to perform digital analysis based on 
Benford’s Law (Benford 1938) for scrutinizing high volumes of complex financial data and 
detecting unintentional errors or fraud (AICPA 2008; Panigrahi 2006; Coderre 1999). However, 
the advantages that these software packages offer for assessing data conformity to Benford’s 
Law are limited due to problems associated with the underlying traditional statistical procedures. 
Specifically, previous studies (e.g., Cho and Gaines 2007; Geyer and Williamson 2004; 
Nigrini 2000) have issued caveats on the use of traditional statistical tests such as chi-square 
goodness-of-fit or Z-tests in the context of Benford’s Law because applications of these tests to 
large data sets may falsely lead auditors to believe that evidence of fraud exists when in fact 
there is none. Nigrini (2000) defines this situation as the problem of “excessive power” (p.75). 
Similarly, Geyer and Williamson (2004) note that “…one has to be careful in such 
situations…where the sample size may be very large, for this [ Z ] test is almost certain to reject 
the null hypothesis for a given significance level” (p. 234). Further, Cho and Gaines (2007) also 
indicate that “…chi-square goodness-of-fit tests are very sensitive to sample size, having 
                                                 
* The authors are, respectively, at Marquette University and Southern Illinois University Carbondale. 
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enormous power for large N, so that even quite small differences will be statistically significant” 
(p. 220). 
In view of the above, we introduce a bootstrap procedure to assess data conformity to 
Benford’s Law that addresses the problem of excessive power (false alarms). The proposed 
procedure is based on developing bootstrap confidence intervals for the mean, variance, skew, 
and kurtosis associated with the first two digits of Benford data (e.g. non-fraudulent data) and 
actual data that are subject to investigation. In addition, bootstrap confidence intervals for the 
Pearson correlation between the first digits and the second digits can also be used as a supportive 
(or decisive) analysis. Unlike the conventional analysis based on Benford’s Law that examines 
financial data on a digit-by-digit basis, the proposed procedure allows auditors to diagnose 
financial transactions on an overall basis. Thus, this procedure takes an approach that is similar 
to what Cleary and Thibodeau (2005) suggested “Perhaps the most prudent approach would be to 
begin the analysis stage with an overall analysis…” (p. 80). 
Applications of the proposed procedure to reported annual earnings of S&P 1500 
companies, Federal Election Commission data, and extremely fraudulent data demonstrate the 
robustness of our procedure over different periods of time and across small or large financial 
data sets. For example, the proposed bootstrap procedure and the traditional statistical tests were 
applied to data sets that closely follow Benford’s Law such as reported annual earnings from 
S&P 1500 companies. The results associated with the bootstrap procedure consistently 
confirmed that the S&P 1500 companies are not likely to be engaged in earnings rounding-up 
behaviors. In contradistinction, the results corresponding with the traditional statistical tests were 
inconsistent across various sample sizes and time periods. Further, the proposed procedure was 
applied to allegedly fraudulent data from the Federal Election Commission (Cho and Gaines 
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2007) and extremely fraudulent data (Geyer and Williamson 2004; Hill 1998). The overall 
results indicate that our procedure accurately detects fraud. 
In the next section we provide the essential requisite information associated with the 
bootstrap in the context of digital analysis and Benford’s Law. In Section III, we present 
applications of the bootstrap procedure to reported annual earnings of S&P 1500 companies, the 
allegedly fraudulent data from the FEC, and extremely fraudulent data. In Section IV, we discuss 
the applications of the procedure and make comments and suggestions for users of the 
methodology.   
II. METHODOLOGY: THE BOOTSTRAP AND BENFORD’S LAW 
The Bootrap 
The bootstrap is a statistical procedure that has the advantage of being able to make 
inferences about a fixed parameter, such as a population mean, without having to make 
assumptions about the shape of the sampling distribution associated with the parameter’s 
estimate. In the context of a population mean (ߠ), its sampling distribution can be thought of as 
the distribution of sample means (ߠ෠௜) from all possible samples of a given sample size. In 
contrast, traditional statistical tests such as Z or t-tests assume that the shape of the sampling 
distribution for the mean has a normal distribution (i.e., a bell-shaped curve). 
The bootstrap method consists of randomly sampling N observations from a data set of 
size N. The random sampling is conducted with replacement and where each observation is 
selected with equal probability. For each bootstrap sample, a sample statistic (e.g. ߠ෠௜) is 
computed. This process is repeated T times to obtain T sample statistics ߠ෠௜ where ݅ ൌ 1, … , ܶ. 
The sample estimates are subsequently ordered from minimum to maximum i.e., min൫ߠ෠௜൯ ൌ
ߠ෠ሺଵሻ,…,max൫ߠ෠௜൯ ൌ ߠ෠ሺ்ሻ and are used to construct a ሺ1 െ ߙሻ100% bootstrap confidence interval 
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ൣߠ෠ሺ்כఈ ଶ⁄ ሻ, ߠ෠ሺ்כሺଵିఈሻ ଶ⁄ ሻ൧ where ߙ is the false alarm or Type I error rate (Efron and Tibshirani 
1998).  
For example, suppose we have a data set that consists of ܰ ൌ5,000 payroll transactions. 
Our first bootstrap sample is generated by sampling with replacement from the data 5,000 
transactions and then the mean (ߠ෠ଵ) is computed for this sample. We repeat this procedure until 
we have generated ܶ ൌ25,000 bootstrap samples and, thus, have computed 25,000 sample means 
ሺߠ෠௜ୀଵ,்ሻ based on the original 5,000 payroll transactions. The sample means ሺߠ෠௜ୀଵ,்ሻ are 
subsequently sorted from minimum to maximum. If one is willing to tolerate false alarms 1% of 
the time (i.e., a Type I error rate of 0.01), then one would select the 125th and 24,875th values 
from the ordered sample means of payroll transactions to be the lower and upper limits of the 
bootstrap confidence interval (C.I.), ൣߠ෠ሺଵଶହሻ, ߠ෠ሺଶସ଼଻ହሻ൧. In short, a 99% bootstrap C.I. has been 
constructed for the sample mean of the payroll transactions. See Figure 1 for an illustration of 
this process. 
Given this introduction to the bootstrap, we subsequently discuss how bootstrapping can 
be used in the context of Benford’s Law and for determining whether or not data are fraudulent 
or contain unintentional errors. For additional details on the bootstrap see Hogg and Tanis 
(2001), Efron and Tibshirani (1998), and Mooney and Duval (1993). 
Benford’s Law 
Benford (1938) observed numerous cases where the probabilities associated with the first 
nine digits follow a logarithmic distribution. For example, digit 1 occurs more often than digit 2, 
in turn, digit 2 occurs more often than digit 3, and successively up to digit 8 which occurs more 
often than digit 9. See Table A.1 in Appendix A for the empirical probabilities associated with 
the Benford (1938) digits. Benford (1938) formalized his observations in formulae to determine 
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the exact probabilities (P) for the first digits (݀ଵ), the second digits (݀ଶ), and the joint 
probabilities for the first two digits (݀ଵ݀ଶ) as: ௗܲభ ൌ logଵ଴ሺ1 ൅ 1 ോ ݀ଵሻ where ݀ଵ ൌ1,…9; 
ௗܲమ ൌ ∑ logଵ଴ሺ1 ൅ 1 ݀ଵ݀ଶ⁄ ሻଽௗభୀଵ  where ݀ଶ ൌ0,…9; and ௗܲభௗమ ൌ logଵ଴ሺ1 ൅ 1 ോ ݀ଵ݀ଶሻ where 
݀ଵ݀ଶ ൌ 10,…,99. Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 give the exact (Benford) probabilities associated with 
the first, second, and first two digits, respectively. It is noted that although Benford (1938) did 
not use financial data, research in accounting and auditing has demonstrated that the probabilities 
of the leading (first, second, or first two) digits of these types of data can also follow Benford’s 
Law (e.g., Caneghem 2004; Durschi et al. 2004; Kinnunnen and Koskela 2003; Nigrini 1996). 
More specifically, and for the purposes considered in this study, if the leading digits associated 
with a set of data follow Benford’s Law then these digits will have the exact probabilities listed 
in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3. And, that these data are presumed not to contain fraudulent 
transactions or unintentional errors. 
As such, if data are assumed to follow Benford’s Law, then the probabilities listed in 
Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 can be used to determine the population parameters of the mean (ߤ), 
variance (ߪଶ), skew (ߛ), and kurtosis (ߜ) for the distributions of the first digits, the second digits, 
and the first two digits from the data set1. More specifically, if we assume that data follow 
Benford’s Law then the following four null hypotheses (ܪ଴௜ ) can be formulated using Table A.3 
for the first two digits (݀ଵ݀ଶ) as ܪ଴ଵ: ߤଵଶ ൌ38.5898, ܪ଴ଶ: ߪଵଶଶ ൌ621.8317, ܪ଴ଷ: ߛଵଶ ൌ0.771864, 
and ܪ଴ସ: ߜଵଶ ൌ െ0.546544 (See Appendix B for more specific details on computing these 
parameters). That is, the first two digits (݀ଵ݀ଶ) of a Benford data set must have these parameters 
for the mean, variance, skew, and kurtosis. These parameters are referred to as “fraud-free” 
because they are derived under the assumption that data follow Benford’s Law. Similarly, using 
                                                 
1 Suppose we have the following payroll transactions: $5846, $2508, $8046, and $1174. The first digits related to 
these transactions are 5, 2, 8, and 1. The second digits are 8, 5, 0, and 1. The first two digits are 58, 25, 80, and 11. 
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Tables A.1 and A.2, null hypotheses could also be separately formulated for the first digits ሺ݀ଵሻ 
with fraud-free parameters of ߤଵ ൌ3.440237, ߪଵଶ ൌ6.056513, ߛଵ ൌ0.795604, and ߜଵ ൌ
െ0.548225; and for the second digits ሺ݀ଶሻ with fraud-free parameters of ߤଶ ൌ4.18730, 
ߪଶଶ ൌ8.25381, ߛଶ ൌ0.133114, and ߜଶ ൌ െ1.208390.  
Given the specified fraud-free parameters above, the proposed bootstrapping procedure 
has essentially three basic steps: (1) obtain the leading first two digits from the actual data set 
under investigation and the exact (or Benford) first two digits which are generated by the user, 
(2) construct bootstrap C.I.s for the mean, variance, skew, and kurtosis based on the actual and 
exact digits, and (3) use the decision criteria provided in Figure 2 to infer whether the actual data 
conform to Benford’ Law (see Figure 2). 
Specifically, and in terms of step (1), the exact digits are generated based on the specific 
N size of the actual data and the exact probabilities for the first, second, and first two digits listed 
in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3. Algorithms and instructions for generating exact digits that have the 
probabilities listed in these tables are available at the following website: 
http://www.siuc.edu/~epse1/headrick/Benford/ExactDigits.doc. 
In terms of step (2), the bootstrap C.I.s for the exact and actual digits can be easily 
constructed using Spotfire S+ (2008) since there are no programming skills required. The 
notations in S+, under the command resample bootstrap, for the sample statistics are: mean(X), 
var(X), skewness(X), and kurtosis(X). We recommend that 99% C.I.s be generated for both the 
exact digits and actual digits using ܶ ൌ25,000 bootstrap samples with the Bias-Corrected 
accelerated (BCa) default option. The 99% C.I. is based on a Boneferroni adjustment to the 
usual false alarm rate (or Type I error rate) of 0.05. Thus, because there are four hypotheses, we 
have a false alarm rate of 0.05 4⁄ ൌ 0.0125 and then rounding to the more commonly used error 
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rate of 0.01. We recommend this conservative level of tolerance for false alarms to prevent 
auditors from making false conclusions when testing all four hypotheses. We note that additional 
step-by-step instructions are also provided for constructing bootstrap C.I.s using S+ at the 
website indicated above. 
The 99% C.I.s generated in step (2) for the exact digits and actual digits are then used in 
conjunction with the decision criteria in Figure 2 to assess whether the actual data contain any 
anomalies such as fraud or unintentional errors. As indicated in Figure 2, if the sample size of the 
actual data is ܰ ൒ 1,000  then the first two digits (݀ଵ݀ଶ) are considered first. Specifically, if all 
four 99% C.I.s based on the actual digits either (a) contain their corresponding population 
parameter (ߤଵଶ ൌ38.5898, ߪଵଶଶ ൌ621.8317, ߛଵଶ ൌ0.771864, ߜଵଶ ൌ െ0.546544) or (b) overlap 
with their corresponding exact digit C.I., then we would fail to reject (or retain) the four null 
hypotheses that are associated with the first two digits (݀ଵ݀ଶ). For example, consider the 
population mean for the first two digits. Suppose that we have a 99% C.I. for the exact digits of 
[38.122 ൑  ߤଵଶ ൑39.013] and a 99% C.I. for the actual digits of [38.557൑ ߤଵଶ ൑39.591]. 
Inspection of these C.I.s indicate that the latter C.I. contains the population mean ሺߤଵଶሻ. 
Alternatively, assume that the actual digit C.I. is [37.555൑ ߤଵଶ ൑38.529*]. This C.I. does 
not contain the population mean, but overlaps with the exact (Benford) digit C.I. [38.122* ൑
 ߤଵଶ ൑39.013] because the lower limit of the exact digit C.I. (38.122ሻ   is less than the upper 
limit of the actual digit C.I. ሺ38.529ሻ. Thus, to reiterate, if the C.I.s for the mean, variance, skew, 
and kurtosis either contain their associated parameter or overlap with their corresponding exact 
digit C.I. then the conclusion would be made that the actual data (e.g., payroll transactions) 
conform to Benford’s Law and, thus, do not have any anomalies (i.e., fraud or unintentional 
errors). Conversely, if we were to reject all four null hypotheses because the actual digit C.I.s 
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neither contain the parameters nor overlap with the exact digit C.I.s, then we would conclude that 
the actual data are likely to contain unintentional errors or fraud and that additional investigation 
is necessary. 
For smaller sample sizes of data (ܰ ൏ 1,000) or for cases where the four hypotheses 
associated with the first two digits (݀ଵ݀ଶ) are inconsistent i.e. the four hypotheses were not all 
rejected (retained), separate single digit analyses are appropriate. That is, check whether the first 
digits and the second digits bootstrap C.I.s contain their corresponding population parameter or 
overlap with their respective Benford C.I.s. If either of these criteria is met, then infer that the 
actual data do not contain unintentional errors or fraud. Otherwise, use the bootstrap C.I. for the 
Pearson correlation between the first digits (݀ଵ) and the second digits (݀ଶ). In a situation where 
the population correlation ሺߩௗభௗమሻ falls within the bootstrap C.I., then conclude that the actual 
data (e.g., payroll transactions) do not contain fraudulent transactions. Otherwise, further 
investigation is necessary. Applications of single digit analysis and Pearson correlation bootstrap 
C.I.s are discussed in more detail using actual data sets in the next section.   
III. APPLICATIONS 
Data 
The proposed bootstrap procedure was applied to three different kinds of data sets. The 
first data set is the reported annual earnings of S&P 1500 companies (1990-2008) from 
Compustat. Specifically, we used positive net income and income before extraordinary items 
(IBEIs) to assess whether the U.S. publicly trading companies engage in cosmetic earnings 
management. Our approach consisted of examining leading (first, second or first two) digits on 
an overall basis rather than on a digit-by-digit basis.  
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Kinnunnen and Koskela (2003) defined a cosmetic earnings management when upward 
(downward) rounding of positive (negative) earnings cause leading digit (first or second digit) 
frequencies to deviate significantly from their expected probabilities according to Benford’s 
Law. For example, Carslaw (1988) found that the frequencies of second digit zeros and nines 
associated with positive reported earnings of New Zealand companies significantly differ from 
their expected probabilities. Further, Thomas (1989) indicated that U.S. companies also engaged 
in cosmetic earnings managements by reporting more second digit zeros and less second digit 
nines for positive earnings. However, the pattern of the actual probabilities for second digits 
zeros and nines is reversed for negative earnings.  
Subsequent studies provide evidence of European and Japanese listed companies also 
exhibited cosmetic earnings management behaviors (Kinnunen and Koskela 2003, Caneghem 
2004, Skousen et al. 2004, Caneghem 2002, Niskanen and Keloharju 2000). Nevertheless, study 
results suggest that external auditors (Guan et al. 2006) or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX] (Aono 
and Guan 2008) likely deter companies from rounding up second digits of earnings towards the 
nearest reference points. All of the above studies examined reported earnings on a digit-by-digit 
basis. However, Cleary and Thibodeau (2005) indicated that conducting nine (or ten) separate 
tests to examine first (second) digits likely increases false alarms (or Type I error). For example, 
a digit-by-digit analysis of the first nine digits likely increases false alarms seven times more 
often than an overall basis analysis of first nine digits for a Type I error rate of 0.05 (Cleary and 
Thibodeau 2005, 80). In view of this problem, it is important to examine reported annual 
earnings on an overall basis. The bootstrap procedure can be used to address this issue.  
In addition, Aono and Guan (2008) used a conservative approach, i.e., a two-year 
window period before and after SOX, to control the problem of excessive power. The authors 
153 
 
commented that “…larger sample size due to the longer pre-SOX windows would increase the Z-
statistic used to measure the significance of changes in the observed proportion of digits between 
the two [pre- and post-SOX] period[s]…” (p. 218). We consider the use of the proposed 
procedure to be appropriate in the context of larger sample sizes. As a result, we selected S&P 
1500 reported earnings for pre- (1990-2002) and post-SOX (2003-2008) periods to examine the 
effects of SOX on U.S. listed companies rounding-up behaviors. 
The second data set relates to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) committee-to-
committee in-kind contributions. The FEC in-kind contributions represent a cash value for 
services donated or bills paid by a third party on behalf of a campaign committee. Unlike regular 
funds raised for candidates that must meet the maximum level requirements (e.g., individual 
contributions up to $2,000 per federal candidates), in-kind contributions (i.e., soft money for 
party committees) are exceptions for this limitation. As a result, the data qualifies for digital 
analysis based on Benford’s Law.  
The third data set concerns known fraudulent data (i.e., cash disbursements and payroll 
information) taken from a 1995 King’s County, New York, District Attorney’s Office study 
(Geyer and Williamson 2004, Hill 1998). We replicated first digits of the fraudulent data based 
on the first digit probabilities listed in Table A. 1 provided by Hill (1998, 363).  
Results 
Tables 1 through 3 give the 99% bootstrap confidence intervals (C.I.s) associated with 
the first two digits of Benford data and reported earnings. The S&P 1500 reported earnings relate 
to the pre- (1990-2002) and post-SOX (2003-2008) periods as well as the combined period 
(1990-2008). Inspection of these tables indicates that evidence of cosmetic earnings management 
is unlikely. In fact, we find no evidence of U.S. listed companies to engage in rounding-up 
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behaviors because the bootstrap C.I.s for the first two digits of net income (or income before 
extraordinary items) either contain population parameters or overlap with the Benford C.I.s in 
each period (see Tables 1, 2, and 3).  
For example, the results in Table 1 show that the lower and upper limits of the 99% 
bootstrap C.I.s associated with the mean of the first two digits of net income (1990–2002) are 
37.743 and 38.658, respectively, and contain the population mean ሺߤଵଶ ൌ 38.58976ሻ—i.e., the 
fraud free parameter. To indicate this result visually, the lower and upper limits are bold and 
double asterisks (**) are included at the end of the upper limit of the actual digits C.I. in each of 
the Tables. On the other hand, the population parameter for the kurtosis ߜଵଶ ൌ െ0.54654 does not 
fall within the 99% bootstrap C.I. associated with the first two digits of net income (1990–2002). 
However, its lower limit (-0.544) overlaps with the upper limit of exact (or Benford) C.I. In this 
case, the lower limit of the bootstrap C.I. for the actual digits (e.g., net income) and the upper 
limit of the Benford C.I. are bold and one asterisk (*) at the end of each lower or upper limits is 
included.  
Likewise, the results in Table 1 related to income before extraordinary items (IBEIs) 
during the pre-SOX period (1990-2002) indicate that the population mean does not fall within 
the actual digits’ C.I. Nevertheless, its upper limit (38.419) overlaps with the lower limit of the 
Benford C.I. The other bootstrap C.I.s associated with the variance, skew, and kurtosis also 
display overlapping C.I.s. In addition, we find either overlapping C.I.s or the population 
parameter falling within the actual digit C.I.s in Tables 2 and 3.  
The overall results in Tables 1 through 3 indicate that separate digit analyses are not 
required. This is because all four first two digits bootstrap C.I.s for reported earnings either 
contain their corresponding population parameter or overlap with the Benford C.I.s. To 
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demonstrate this point, for example, the results in Tables 4 and 5 show that all four first (or 
second) digits 99% bootstrap C.I.s for IBEIs either contain their corresponding population 
parameter or overlap with their respective Benford C.I.s (see Tables 4 and 5). 
However, inspection of Table 6 indicates that the results associated with the Nigrini 
(1996) distortion factor indices (Z-tests) and chi-square goodness-of-fit tests differ from those 
reported under the bootstrap procedure and suggest evidence of cosmetic earnings management 
during the pre- and post-SOX periods. These differences indicate that traditional statistical 
procedures (e.g., Z-tests or chi-square goodness-of-fit tests) may exhibit the problem of 
excessive power. That is, the results of traditional statistical procedures may provide evidence of 
cosmetic earnings management as the number of transactions gets larger when, in fact, there is 
none. To demonstrate this problem, we used the Euclidean distance ሺܧܦሻ on the first digits and 
bootstrap C.I.s for the Pearson correlation ሺߩௗభௗమሻ between the first digits and second digits.  
The application of the Euclidean distance (ED) in the context of Benford’ Law consists of 
finding an index of distance between the actual first digit probabilities (݌௜) and the first digit 
exact (Benford) probabilities (ܾ௜), where i=1,…9. Given these probabilities, the Euclidean 
distance in the context of Benford’s Law is computed as ܧܦ ൌ ට∑ ሺ݌௜ െ ܾ௜ሻଶଽ௜ୀଵ . Intuitively, the 
larger the distance, the worse the fit of a data set to Benford’s Law (i.e., a data set with potential 
fraud). Despite its simple application in the context of Benford’s Law, the Euclidean distance is 
not an inferential statistic. Thus, it cannot be used to summarize the main characteristic of the 
actual digits (e.g., amount of variations in payroll transactions) and infer whether the actual data 
contain unintentional errors or fraudulent transactions for a given level of confidence.  
As such, the approach taken here will be that of Cho and Gaines (2007) who compared 
the Euclidean distance for each one of the FEC data sets (1998-2006) to the cut-off value of 
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ܧܦכ ൌ0.024. This value of ܧܦכ is computed by using the exact ሺܾ௜ሻ and empirical Benford 
(1938) probabilities ሺ݌௜ሻ listed in Table A.1. Cho and Gaines (2007) submitted that this distance 
measure of ܧܦכ represents “a rough sense for what constitutes a realistic, small value [associated 
with empirical Benford data]” (p.221). Euclidean distances less than ܧܦכ and closer to zero 
imply that data more closely conform to Benford’s Law than the Euclidean distance greater than 
ܧܦכ and nearer to one. Thus, the lower and upper limits of the Euclidean distance are zero and 
one, respectively (i.e., ܧܦ א ሾ0,1ሿ), where a value of ܧܦ ൌ0 implies an exact correspondence to 
the first digit probabilities of Benford’s Law. The Euclidean distances reported in Table 6 are 
much smaller than ܧܦכ ൌ0.024, suggesting that the reported earnings data more closely follow 
Benford’s exact probabilities than Benford’s (1938) empirical probabilities (see Table 6). 
In addition, the Pearson correlation coefficient indicates the strength and direction of the 
linear relationship between the first digits and second digits. In the context of hypothesis testing, 
we state that data free of fraud or unintentional errors will have a population correlation 
coefficient between the first digits (݀ଵ) and the second digits (݀ଶ) of ߩௗభௗమ ൌ 0.0561. That is, 
the null hypothesis associated with the fraud-free parameter is ܪ଴: ߩௗభௗమ ൌ 0.0561. See at the 
end of Appendix B for derivation of the population correlation. The results in Table 7 indicate 
that, for pre- and post-SOX periods, each of the bootstrap C.I.s for the Pearson correlation 
coefficient contains the population correlation ሺߩௗభௗమሻ and, thus, lends to the bootstrap analyses 
that the annual reported earnings (net income and IBEIs) conform to Benford’s Law. Note that 
the bootstrap correlation C.I.s were based on 25,000 random samples for a given 99% confidence 
level that is consistent with the construction of leading digits bootstrap C.I.s (see Table 7). 
In summary, both the Euclidean distances and the Pearson correlation bootstrap C.I.s 
provide evidence that the bootstrap procedure does not exhibit the problem of excessive power. 
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Therefore, these two indices suggest that the Nigrini (1996) distortion factor index (Z-test) and 
the chi-square goodness-of-fit test have this problem. 
In addition to the S&P 1500 reported earnings, we applied the proposed procedure to the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) committee to committee in-kind contributions for years 
1998, 2000, and 2002. The results in Table 8 indicate that the 1998 FEC data contain allegedly 
fraudulent transactions. Specifically, all of the four C.I.s associated with the first two digits of 
the 1998 FEC data do not contain the corresponding population parameter and, thus, suggest that 
single digit analyses are not necessary. In fact, the results in Tables 9 and 10 provide support for 
this conclusion (see Tables 8, 9, and 10).  
On the other hand, the results in Table 11 show that only one C.I. associated with the first 
two digits of the 2002 FEC data contain the population parameter (i.e., mean). As a result, single 
digit analyses are required. The results in Tables 12 and 13 indicate that the decision criteria for 
separate single digit analyses described in Figure 2 are not met. In other words, all C.I.s 
associated with the first digits and the second digits of the 2002 FEC data neither contain the 
corresponding population parameter nor overlap with the exact (Benford) digit C.I.s. Therefore, 
we conducted the Pearson correlation analysis and concluded that the 2002 FEC data are 
fraudulent.  That is, the 99% bootstrap C.I. for the Pearson correlation between the first digits 
and the second digits of the 2002 FEC data do not contain the population correlation ሺߩௗభௗమሻ. 
See Table 7 for further details (see Tables 11, 12, and 13).  
The bootstrap C.I.s for the Pearson correlation can be used as a decisive factor when the 
results of the bootstrap procedure do not meet the decision criteria for the digit analyses 
described in Figure 2. In particular, the results associated with the 2000 FEC data in Tables 14, 
15, and 16 indicate that only two out of four C.I.s for the first two digits contain the population 
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parameters. The follow-up separate analyses also show that only two out of four C.I.s for the first 
digits and one out of four C.I.s for the second digits either contain the corresponding population 
parameter or overlap with the Benford C.I.s. Up to this point, the evidence is not clear enough to 
infer whether any potential anomalies (i.e., suspicious transactions from committees to 
committees) exist in the 2000 FEC data (see Tables 14, 15, and 16). 
However, the results in Table 7 show that the Pearson correlation between the first digits 
and the second digits of the 2000 FEC data is 0.144 which differs significantly from the 
population correlation ሺߩௗభௗమ ൌ 0.0561ሻ. Altogether the first two digits or single digit analyses 
for the 1998, 2000, and 2002 FEC data present evidence that support the observations made by 
Cho and Gaines (2007). That is, allocations of “soft” money from committee to committee in 
each one of these election cycles (i.e., 1998, 2000, and 2002) were likely manipulated.  
Finally, the proposed methodology was applied to simulated first digits of extremely 
fraudulent data based on the probabilities provided by Hill (1998). We note that Hill’s (1998) 
study is limited to first digits analysis. Despite this limitation, we generated two different sample 
sizes of data (N=20,229 and N=500) to demonstrate that our proposed procedure accurately 
detects fraudulent transactions regardless of sample size. The results listed in Table 17 indicate 
that the bootstrap procedure consistently rejects the four null hypotheses for both large 
Nൌ20,229 and small Nൌ500 sample sizes and provides the same conclusions as those made by 
Hill (1998) (see Table 17).  
IV. DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS 
The bootstrap procedure provides accurate and consistent results over different time 
periods and across different volumes of transactions as opposed to the Nigrini (1996) distortion 
factor index (Z-test) or chi-square goodness-of-fit tests. These results show that the bootstrap 
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procedure ameliorates the problem of excessive power described by Nigrini (2000). In addition, 
our procedure has advantages compared to other approaches such as the mean absolute deviation 
(MAD), the Euclidean distance, or Bayesian methods that do not exhibit the problem of 
excessive power. Specifically, the mean absolute deviation and the Euclidean distance do not 
allow practicing auditors to make probabilistic statements of whether data conform to Benford’s 
Law (Cho and Gaines 2007; Nigrini 2000). Geyer and Williamson (2004) restricted their 
Bayesian method to first digit analysis. This restriction may prevent auditors from detecting 
fabricated data where inspection of second, third, or later digits increases the likelihood of 
discovering suspicious fraudulent entries; and when, in some instances, first digit probability 
distribution of fabricated data does result in a Benford-like pattern (Diekmann 2007; 328).  
It is also noteworthy to point out that the bootstrap procedure allows auditors to examine 
financial data sets on an overall basis. This approach differs from the statistical procedure used 
by Aono and Guan (2008) et al. who conducted multiple Z-tests on a digit-by-digit basis. To 
assess data conformity to Benford’s Law, we recommend that an overall analysis be used rather 
than a digit-by-digit analysis because the latter approach inflates false alarms (Type I error) as 
the number of digits to be examined increases (Cleary and Thibodeau 2005). Further, we suggest 
that bootstrap confidence intervals (C.I.s) of the Pearson correlation between the first digits and 
the second digits be used as a decisive factor in situations where the evidence does not clearly 
indicate whether data follow Benford’s Law. Furthermore, we note that the minimum sample 
size required to conduct the first and second digit analysis is Nൌ1,000 observations. For samples 
sizes of less than 1000, it is recommended that only separate single digit analyses be performed. 
The primary reason is that the proposed bootstrap procedure does not provide stable upper or 
lower limits for the first two digits exact (Benford) C.I.s for sample sizes less than 1000. 
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As a final point, we would recommend that practicing auditors be aware of certain 
conditions where applications of the proposed procedure to large data sets (e.g., transaction-level 
or large data sets) may not be appropriate. Some of these situations involve assigned numbers, 
numbers influenced by human thoughts, accounts set up to record firm specific numbers, or 
numbers with maximum or minimum thresholds that comprise financial data subject to 
investigations. Also our procedure may not be useful to detect fraud in the case where financial 
data do not have records of suspicious transactions such as “thefts, kickbacks, bribes or contract 
rigging” (Durtschi, Hillison and Pacini 2004, p. 24).  
 
161 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aono, J.Y., and Guan, L. 2008. The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Cosmetic Earnings 
Management. Research in Accounting Regulation 20: 211-221. 
ACL for Windows. 2006. Version 9, Workbook, Vancouver: ACL: Services, Ltd. 
AICPA. 2008. CAATTs frequently asked questions. The American Institute of Certified 
Accountants (AICPA) Accessed at: 
http://www.aicpa.org/download/infotech/2008_Top_Tech/CAATTs_FAQ_Document.pdf 
Benford, F. 1938. The Law of anomalous numbers. Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society 78 (4): 551-572. 
Bolton, R.J. and Hand, D.J. 2002. Statistical Fraud Detection: A Review. Statistical Science 
17(3): 235-249. 
Caneghem, T.V. 2004. The impact of audit quality on earnings rounding-up behavior: Some UK 
evidence. European Accounting Review 13 (4): 771-786. 
___________ 2002. Earnings management induced by cognitive reference points. British 
Accounting Review 34: 167-178. 
Carslaw C.A.P.N. 1988. Anomalies in income numbers: Evidence of goal oriented behavior. The 
Accounting Review LXIII(2): 321-327. 
Cho, W. K. and B. J. Gaines. 2007. Breaking the (Benford) Law: Statistical fraud detection in 
campaign finance. The American Statistician 61 (3): 218 - 223. 
Cleary, R. and J. C. Thibodeau. 2005. Applying digital analysis using Benford’s Law to detect 
fraud: The dangers of type I error rate. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 24 (1): 
77-81. 
162 
 
Coderre .1999. Computer-assisted techniques for fraud detection. The CPA Journal 69(8): 57-59. 
Diekmann, A. 2007. Not the first digit! Using Benford’s Law to detect fraudulent scientific data. 
Journal of Applied Statistics 34(3): 321-329. 
Durtschi, C. et al. 2004. The effective use of Benford’s Law to assist in detecting fraud in 
accounting data. Journal of Forensic Accounting V: 17-34. 
Efron, B. and Tibshirani, R. J. 1998. An introduction to the bootstrap. Monographs on Statistics 
and Applied Probability 57, Chapman and Hall/CRC, Boca Raton, Florida. 
Geyer, C. L., and Williamson, P. P. 2004. Detecting fraud in data sets using Benford’s Law. 
Communications in Statistics: Simulation and Computation 33 (1): 229-246. 
Guan L. et al. 2006. Auditing, integral approach to quarterly reporting, and cosmetic earnings 
management. Managerial Auditing Journal. 21(6): 569-581. 
Hill, T.P. 1998. The first digit phenomenon. American Scientist 86: 358-363. 
Hogg, R.V., and Tanis, E.A. 2001. Probability and statistical inference, 6th Ed. New Jersey, 
Prentice Hall.  
Kendall, M. G. and Stuart, A. 1977. The advanced theory of statistics, 4th Ed. New York: 
MacMillan. 
Kinnunnen, J. and Koskela, M. 2003. Who is miss world in cosmetic earnings management? A 
cross-national comparison of small upward rounding of net income numbers among 
eighteen countries. Journal of International Accounting Research 2: 39-68 
Mooney, C. Z. and Duval, R. 1993. Bootstrapping a nonparametric approach to statistical 
inference. Sage Publications, California. 
Nigrini, M. J. 2000. Digital Analysis using Benford’s Law: Tests and statistics for auditors. 
Global Audit Publications, Canada. 
163 
 
___________ 1996. A taxpayer compliance application of Benford’s Law. The Journal of the 
American Taxation Association 18 (Spring): 72-91. 
Niskanen, J. and Keloharju, M. 2000. Earnings cosmetics in a tax-driven accounting 
environment: Evidence from Finnish public firms. The European Accounting Review 
9(3): 443-452. 
Panigrahi, P.K. 2006. Discovering fraud in forensic accounting using data mining techniques. 
The Chartered Accountant (April): 1426-1430.  
Skousen C.J. et al. 2004. Anomalies and unusual patterns in reported earnings: Japanese 
managers round earnings. Journal of International Financial Management and 
Accounting 15(3): 212-234. 
Spotfire S+ 8.1 for Windows. 2008. Palo Alto, CA: TIBCO Software. 
Thomas, J.K. 1989. Unusual patterns in reported annual earnings. The Accounting Review 
LXIV(4): 773-787. 
164 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1. Exact, Benford (1938), and Fraudulent data empirical first digit probabilities.  
First Digits (݀ଵሻ 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Exact Benford 0.301 0.176 0.125 0.097 0.079 0.067 0.058 0.051 0.046 
Empirical Benford 0.289 0.195 0.127 0.091 0.075 0.064 0.054 0.055 0.051 
Fraudulent Data 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.097 0.612 0.233 0.010 0.029 0.000 
Exact = theoretical probabilities are computed as ௗܲభ ൌ ݈݋݃ଵ଴ሺ1 ൅ 1 ോ ݀ଵሻ where ݀ଵ ൌ1,…9. 
Benford = empirical first digit probabilities estimated by Benford (1938) who used a sample of 20,229 observations. 
Fraudulent data = fraudulent data relate to cash disbursement and payroll information that was taken from a 1995 
King’s County, New York, District Attorney’s Office study (Hill 1998, p.363). 
 
Table A.2. Exact second digit probabilities. 
Second Digits (݀ଶሻ 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Exact Benford 0.120 0.114 0.109 0.104 0.100 0.097 0.093 0.090 0.088 0.085 
ExactBenford = theoretical probabilities are computed as ௗܲమ ൌ ∑ ݈݋݃ଵ଴ሺ1 ൅ 1 ݀ଵ݀ଶ⁄ ሻଽௗభୀଵ  where ݀ଶ ൌ0,…9. 
 
Table A.3. Exact (Benford) probabilities (p) for the joint occurrence of the first two digits ሺࢊ૚ࢊ૛ሻ. 
݀ଵ݀ଶ p ݀ଵ݀ଶ p ݀ଵ݀ଶ P ݀ଵ݀ଶ p ݀ଵ݀ଶ p 
10 0.041392 28 0.015240 46 0.009340 64 0.006733 82 0.005264 
11 0.037788 29 0.014723 47 0.009143 65 0.006630 83 0.005201 
12 0.034762 30 0.014240 48 0.008955 66 0.006531 84 0.005140 
13 0.032184 31 0.013788 49 0.008774 67 0.006434 85 0.005080 
14 0.029963 32 0.013364 50 0.008600 68 0.006340 86 0.005021 
15 0.028029 33 0.012965 51 0.008433 69 0.006249 87 0.004963 
16 0.026329 34 0.012589 52 0.008272 70 0.006160 88 0.004907 
17 0.024824 35 0.012234 53 0.008118 71 0.006074 89 0.004852 
18 0.023481 36 0.011899 54 0.007969 72 0.005990 90 0.004799 
19 0.022277 37 0.011582 55 0.007825 73 0.005909 91 0.004746 
20 0.021189 38 0.011281 56 0.007687 74 0.005830 92 0.004695 
21 0.020203 39 0.010995 57 0.007553 75 0.005752 93 0.004645 
22 0.019305 40 0.010724 58 0.007424 76 0.005677 94 0.004596 
23 0.018483 41 0.010465 59 0.007299 77 0.005604 95 0.004548 
24 0.017729 42 0.010219 60 0.007178 78 0.005532 96 0.004500 
25 0.017033 43 0.009984 61 0.007062 79 0.005463 97 0.004454 
26 0.016390 44 0.009760 62 0.006949 80 0.005395 98 0.004409 
27 0.015794 45 0.009545 63 0.006839 81 0.005329 99 0.004365 
Exact Benford = theoretical probabilities are computed as ௗܲభௗమ ൌ ݈݋݃ଵ଴ሺ1 ൅ 1 ോ ݀ଵ݀ଶሻ where ݀ଵ݀ଶ ൌ 
10,…,99.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
The formulae for the population mean ሺߤሻ, variance ሺߪଶሻ, skew (ߛሻ, and kurtosis ሺߜሻ for 
the probability distributions in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in Appendix A are as follows (Kendall 
& Stuart, 1977, Eq’s 41, 89, 90): 
ߤ ൌ ߤଵ (B.1) 
ߪଶ ൌ ߤଶ െ ߤଵଶ (B.2) 
ߛ ൌ ሺߤଷ െ 3ߤଶߤଵ ൅ 2ߤଵଷሻ ോ ߪଷ (B.3) 
ߜ ൌ ሺߤସ െ 4ߤଷߤଵ െ 3ߤଶଶ ൅ 12ߤଶߤଵଶ െ 6ߤଵସሻ ോ ߪସ (B.4) 
The moments ሺߤ௥ሻ for the probability distributions in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 are 
determined as ߤ௥ ൌ ∑ ݀ଵ௥ ௗܲభଽௗభୀଵ , ߤ௥ ൌ ∑ ݀ଶ௥ ௗܲమଽௗమୀ଴ , and  ߤ௥ ൌ ∑ ሺ݀ଵ݀ଶሻ௥ ௗܲభௗమଽଽௗభௗమୀଵ଴  where 
ݎ ൌ1,…,4. Substituting the moments into Eq’s (B.1), (B.2), (B.3), and (B.4) we obtain the 
population parameters for the leading digits (the first, second, or first two digits). 
For example, the first four moments ሺߤଵ, ߤଶ, ߤଷ, and ߤସሻ would be 3.44024, 17.89174, 
115.08205 and 823.27310, respectively. Given these values, the population mean  1 , variance 
 21 , skew  1  and kurtosis  1  would be ߤଵ ൌ ∑ ݀ଵ ௗܲభ ൌ 3.44024ଽௗభୀଵ , ߪଵଶ ൌ ߤଶ െ ሺߤଵଶሻ ൌ
17.89174 െ ሺ3.44024ଶሻ ൌ 6.05651,  ߛଵ ൌ ሺߤଷ െ 3ߤଶߤଵ ൅ 2ߤଷሻ ߪଷ⁄ ൌ ۃ115.08205 െ
3ሺ17.89174 ൈ 3.44014ሻ ൅ 2ሺ3.44024ଷሻۄ/6.05651ଷ/ଶ ൌ 0.79560 and 
ߜଵ ൌ ሺߤସ െ 4ߤଷߤଵ െ 3ߤଶଶ ൅ 12ߤଶߤଵଶ െ 6ߤଵସሻ ߪସ⁄ ൌ ۃ823.2731 െ 4ሺ115.08205 ൈ 3.440234ሻ െ
3ሺ17.89174ሻଶ ൅ 12ሺ17.891743 ൈ 3.44024ଶሻ െ 6ሺ3.44024ሻସۄ/6.05651ሺସ ଶ⁄ ሻ ൌ െ0.54823, 
respectively.  
Following the same steps as for the first digits, the population mean, variance, skew and 
kurtosis for the second digits would be ߤଶ ൌ ∑ ݀ଶ ௗܲమଽௗమୀ଴ ൌ 4.18739, ߪଶଶ ൌ 8.25381, , ߛଶ ൌ
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0.133114, and ߜଶ ൌ െ1.208390, respectively. Similarly, the population mean, variance, skew 
and kurtosis for the first two digits would be ߤଵଶ ൌ ∑  ሺ݀ଵ݀ଶሻ ௗܲభௗమଽଽௗభௗమୀଵ଴ ൌ 38.5898,  ߪଵଶଶ ൌ
621.8317,  ߛଵଶ ൌ 0.771864,  ߜଵଶ ൌ െ0.546544,   respectively. 
The population correlation between the first digits and the second digits is determined as 
ߩௗభௗమ ൌ ሺܧሾ݀ଵ݀ଶሿ െ ߤଵߤଶሻ ሺߪଵଶߪଶଶሻ
భ
మ⁄ ൌ0.05605574. The ܧሾ݀ଵ݀ଶሿ ൌ14.801940 and is based on 
the probabilities given in Table A.3 and computed as 
ܧሾ݀ଵ݀ଶሿ ൌ ∑ ∑ ሺ݀ଵሻሺ݀ଶሻ logଵ଴ሺ1 ൅ 1 ോ ݀ଵ݀ଶଽௗమୀ଴ଽௗభୀଵ ሻ. 
  
167 
 
 
Figure 1. Basic bootstrap process for estimating sample statistics and constructing a 
confidence interval.
 1 2 4999, 5000, , ,X x x x x   Payroll transaction 
data 
Sample 25000 
Bootstrap 
samples of 
payroll 
expenses 
 2ˆ   25000ˆ   1ˆ   Mean of payroll expenses 
Sort iˆ  from minimum to maximum 
(1) (2) (125) (126) (24875) (24876) (24999) (25000)ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , , , ,           
Construct the 99% confidence interval 
(125) (24875)ˆ ˆ,     
Sample 1 Sample 2 
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Figure 2. Bootstrap procedure application to digital analysis based on Benford’s Law 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Start 
Select the first two digits, the first digits and the 
second digits of the Actual Data (e.g., payroll 
transactions). 
Execute algorithms to generate Exact 
Benford first two digits, first digits and 
second digits given the sample size (N) of the 
actual data. 
Input the first two digits, first digits, and 
second digits to the spreadsheet of S+(2008) 
Under the command resample using ܶ ൌ25,000 samples, compute bootstrap C.I.s based on notations 
for the sample statistics [mean(X), var(X), skewness(X), and kurtosis(X)], the Bias-corrected (BCa) 
C.I. default option and 99% confidence level.
Conduct First Two Digits Analysis and use the 
following Decision Criteria. 
 
Decision Criteria: 
Do all (none) of the four C.I.s associated with 
the first two digits of the actual data overlap 
with Benford C.I.s or contain population 
parameters? 
Yes 
Infer that the actual data 
(e.g., payroll transactions) 
do not (do) contain 
unintentional errors or 
fraud. 
Conduct single digit analyses for the 
first digits and the second digits: 
Do all of the first digits and the second 
digits C.I.s of the actual data overlap 
with Benford C.I.s or contain population 
parameters? 
Stop 
Is the sample size (ܰሻ ൒ 1,000 ? 
Yes 
Does the 99% Bootstrap C.I. for the 
Pearson Correlation contain the 
population parameter (ߩௗభௗమ)? 
Infer that the actual data (e.g., payroll transactions) 
do contain unintentional errors or fraud. 
Infer that the actual 
data do not contain 
unintentional errors 
or fraud. 
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Table 1. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Two Digits of S&P 1500 Companies Earnings (1990 - 2002) a/. 
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
  12 38.58976   212 621.83174   12 0.77186   12 0.54654    
 Exact Benford 37.951* 12  39.170 608.472* 212  636.277 0.729* 12  0.811 -0.603 12  -0.472* 
19,076N 
 
Net Income 
(Thousands) 
37.743 12  38.658** 590.304 212  618.271* 0.765 12  0.828** -0.544* 12  -0.404 
20,939N 
 
IBEIs*** 
(Thousands) 
37.555 12  38.419* 588.599 212  614.973* 0.774 12  0.836* -0.526* 12  -0.392 
 
Table 2. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Two Digits of S&P 1500 Companies Earnings (2003 - 2008) a/. 
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
  12 38.58976   212 621.83174   12 0.77186   12 0.54654    
 Exact Benford 38.114* 12  39.113 605.754 212  636.380 0.738* 12  0.807 -0.619* 12  -0.474 
16, 455N 
 
Net Income 
(Thousands) 
38.577 12  39.591** 610.674 212  640.437** 0.706 12  0.773** -0.654 12  -0.517** 
18,391N   IBEIs ***  (Thousands) 38.870 12  39.821* 611.999
2
12  640.115** 0.697 12  0.760* -0.677 12  -0.548* 
 
Table 3. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Two Digits of S&P 1500 Companies Earnings (1900 - 2008) a/. 
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
  12 38.58976   212 621.83174   12 0.77186   12 0.54654    
 Exact Benford 38.211 12  38.907 611.915 212  632.071 0.748 12  0.795 -0.594 12  -0.496 
35,531N   Net Income 
(Thousands) 
38.250 12  38.931** 604.647 212  624.709** 0.748 12  0.794** -0.578 12  -0.478** 
39,330N   IBEIs ***  (Thousands) 38.282 12  38.930** 602.968
2
12  622.665** 0.745 12  0.788** -0.577 12  -0.485** 
* Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data overlap with Benford intervals, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis. 
** Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data contain population parameter, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis. 
*** IBEIs=Income before extraordinary items. 
a/ Source of data is Compustat. 
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Table 4. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Digits of S&P 1500 Companies Earnings (2003-2008) a/. 
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
  
1 3.440237   21 6.056513   1 0.795604   1 0.548225    
 Exact Benford 3.391 1  3.486* 5.920 21  6.196 0.765* 1  0.831 -0.619 1  -0.478 
18,391N   IBEIs *** 
(Thousands) 
3.472* 1  3.564 5.959 21  6.234** 0.724 1  0.789* -0.678 1  -0.547** 
 
Table 5. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for Second Digits of S&P 1500 Companies Earnings (2003-2008) a/. 
 Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
  
2 4.18739   22 8.25381   2 0.133114   2 1.208390    
 Exact Benford 4.131 2 4.240 8.124 22  8.403 0.108 2 0.162 -1.230 2  -1.184 
18,391N   IBEIs *** 
(Thousands) 
4.108 2  4.217** 8.119 22  8.396** 0.124 2 0.179** -1.235 2  -1.188** 
* Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data overlap with Benford intervals, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis. 
** Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data contain population parameter, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis. 
*** IBEIs=Income before extraordinary items. 
a/ Source of data is Compustat. 
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Table 6. Nigrini (1996) Distortion Factor Z-Test ሺࢆሻ, Euclidean Distance ൫ࡱࡰࢊ૚൯, and Chi-Square 
Goodness of Fit Test ൫࣑૛൯  for Earnings of S&P 1500 Companies.  
Period Reported Earnings N Z ܧܦௗభ ߯ଶ 
1990 - 2002 Net Income a/ 19,076 
 
-2.22949 b/  0.008503 c/ 19.592 b/ for d1  
16.926 b/ for d2 
1990 - 2002 Income before 
Extraordinary Items 
(IBEIs) a/ 
20,939 
 
3.61030 b/  0.007760 c/ 17.367 b/ for d1  
27.939 d/ for d2 
2003 - 2008 Net Income a/ 16,455 
 
2.41083 b/  0.014034 c/ 19.592 b/ for d1 
 21.958 d/ for d2 
2003 - 2008 Income before 
Extraordinary Items 
(IBEIs) a/ 
18,391 
 
3.92758 b/  0.018900 c/ 38.391 d/ for d1  
24.001 d/ for d2 
1990 - 2008 Net Income a/ 35,531 
 
-0.00261 
 
 0.009116 c/ 23.001 d/ for d1 
 28.213 d/ for d2 
1990 - 2008 Income before 
Extraordinary Items 
(IBEIs) a/ 
39,330 
 
0.04239 
 
 0.008579 c/ 11.056 b/ for d1  
16.140 b/ for d2 
a/  Source of data is Compustat. 
b/  p-value < 0.05  
c/  ED < Empirical Benford (1938) Euclidean Distance ED*=0.024  (Cho and Gaines, 2007). d/  p-value < 0.01 
 
where 
d1 = first digits and d2 = second digits 
ܼ ൌ ܦܨ ോ ܵܦ where ܦܨ ൌ ሺܣܯ െ ܧܯሻ ോ ܧܯ, ܣܯ is the actual mean of N  collapsed numbers scaled to 
the interval ሾ10,100ሻ and ܧܯ is the expected mean equal to ܧܯ ൌ 90 ോ ሺܰ൫10ଵ ே⁄ െ 1൯ሻ, and  ܵܦ ൌ
0.63825342 ോ √ܰ (Nigrini, 1996).  
ܧܦ ൌ ට∑ ሺ݌௜ െ ܾ௜ሻଶଽ௜ୀଵ  where ݌௜ and ܾ௜ are the probabilities associated with a data set and exact Benford 
probabilities, respectively. 
߯ଶ ൌ ∑ ሺ ௜ܱ െ ܧ௜ሻଶ ോ ܧ௜௜  where Oi  and Ei  are the observed and expected frequencies for the i-th digit. 
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Table 7. The 99% Confidence Intervals for the Pearson Correlation Coefficients.  
Population Correlation (ߩௗభௗమ= 0.05605574) 
 Sample Size Time Period Pearson 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
൫ߩොௗభௗమ൯ 
99% Bootstrap Confidence 
Intervals (C.I.s) for Pearson 
Correlation Coefficient ሺߩሻ 
Net Income a/ 
19,076N   1990-2002 0.048 c/ 0.028018
1 2d d
  0.065154**
16, 455N   2003-2008 0.057 c/ 0.037630
1 2d d
  0.077312**
35,531N   1990-2008 0.052 c/ 0.038199
1 2d d
  0.065419**
     
Income before 
Extraordinary Items 
(IBEIs) a/ 
20,939N   1990-2002 0.049 c/ 0.032228
1 2d d
  0.067095**
18,391N   2003-2008 0.053 c/ 0.033172
1 2d d
  0.070844**
39,330N   1990-2008 0.051 c/ 0.038450
1 2d d
  0.063920**
     
Committee-to-
Committee In-Kind 
Contribution b/ 
9,878N   1998 -0.010 -0.037859
1 2d d
  0.014954
10,759N   2000 0.144 c/ 0.118483
1 2d d
  0.167231
10,745N   2002 0.178 c/ 0.152893
1 2d d
  0.201943
a/ Source of data is Compustat. 
b/ Data is accessed at the Federal Election Commission website 
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml. 
c/ p-value < 0.01 
 
** Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data contain population parameter, and thus retain 
the corresponding null hypothesis. 
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Table 8. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Two Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 1998 b/. 
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
9,878N   12 38.58976   212 621.83174   12 0.77186   12 0.54654    
Exact Benford 37.968 12  39.255 602.032 212  641.456 0.729 12  0.817 -0.636 12  -0.452 
Net Income 
(Thousands) 
35.528 12  36.686 466.633 212  503.718 0.880 12  0.969 0.051 12  0.292 
 
Table 9. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 1998 b/. 
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
9,878N   1 3.440237   21 6.056513   1 0.795604   1 0.548225    
Exact Benford 3.373 1  3.500 5.867 21  6.248 0.751 1  0.841 -0.636 1  -0.446 
Net Income 
(Thousands) 
3.185 1  3.298 4.604 21  4.956 0.861 1  0.948 -0.103 1  0.123 
 
Table 10. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for Second Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 1998 b/. 
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
9,878N   2 4.18739   22 8.25381   2 0.133114   2 1.208390    
Exact Benford 4.113 2 4.261 8.072 22  8.456 0.095 2 0.170 -1.237 2  -1.174 
Net Income 
(Thousands) 
3.635 2 3.789 8.653 22  9.057 0.215 2 0.292 -1.241 2  -1.168** 
 
Table 11. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Two Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 2002 b/. 
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
10,745N   12 38.58976   212 621.83174   12 0.77186   12 0.54654    
Exact Benford 37.943 12  39.183 603.429 212  640.802 0.733 12  0.815 -0.634 12  -0.457 
Net Income 
(Thousands) 
38.251 12  39.528** 633.833 212  680.387 0.953 12  1.037 -0.117 12  0.127 
* Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data overlap with Benford intervals, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis. 
** Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data contain population parameter, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis. 
b/ Data is accessed at the Federal Election Commission website http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml. 
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Table 12. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 2002 b/. 
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
10,745N   1 3.440237   21 6.056513   1 0.795604   1 0.548225    
Exact Benford 3.378 1  3.500 5.862 21  6.229 0.753 1  0.840 -0.634 1  -0.451 
Net Income 
(Thousands) 
3.401 1  3.528** 6.011 21  6.422** 0.908 1  0.994 -0.283 1  -0.055 
 
Table 13. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for Second Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 2002 b/. 
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
10,745N   2 4.18739   22 8.25381   2 0.133114   2 1.208390    
Exact Benford 4.113 2 4.255 8.060 22  8.427 0.097 2 0.168 -1.241 2  -1.180 
Net Income 
(Thousands) 
4.126 2 4.276** 8.908 22  9.284 0.017 2 0.090 -1.322 2  -1.268 
 
Table 14. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Two Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 2000 b/. 
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
10,759N   12 38.58976   212 621.83174   12 0.77186   12 0.54654    
Exact Benford 37.949 12  39.194 603.981 212  640.660 0.733 12  0.817 -0.631 12  -0.451 
Amount 38.258 12  39.543** 619.184 212  661.486** 0.866 12  0.951 -0.324 12  -0.107 
 
Table 15. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 2000 b/. 
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
Exact Benford 
1 3.440237   21 6.056513   1 0.795604   1 0.548225    
Benford 3.377 1  3.500* 5.880 21  6.243 0.751 1  0.836 -0.642 1  -0.459 
Amount 3.441* 1  3.563 5.894 21  6.283** 0.826 1  0.909 -0.433 1  -0.232 
* Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data overlap with Benford intervals, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis. 
** Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data contain population parameter, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis. 
b/ Data is accessed at the Federal Election Commission website http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml. 
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Table 16. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for Second Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 2000 b/. 
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
10,759N   2 4.18739   22 8.25381   2 0.133114   2 1.208390    
Exact Benford 4.115 2 4.260 8.081 22  8.447 0.097 2 0.168 -1.238 2  -1.177 
Amount 3.911 2 4.067 9.550 22  9.953 0.132 2 0.206** -1.343 2  -1.284 
 
Table 17. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Digits of an Extreme Fraud Data c/. 
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis 
20, 229N   1 3.440237   21 6.056513   1 0.795604   1 0.548225    
Exact Benford 3.400 1  3.491 5.925 21  6.193 0.767 1  0.828 -0.612 1  -0.477 
Extreme Fraud Data 5.171 1  5.203 0.735 21  0.803 -0.0382 1  0.200 3.910 1  4.275 
 
500N   1 3.440237   21 6.056513   1 0.795604   1 0.548225    
Exact Benford 3.142 1  3.714 5.265 21  6.953 0.602 1  0.996 -0.920 1  -0.078 
Extreme Fraud Data 5.084 1  5.286 0.570 21  1.004 -0.693 1  0.897 3.067 1  5.491 
* Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data overlap with Benford intervals, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis. 
** Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data contain population parameter, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis. 
b/ Data is accessed at the Federal Election Commission website http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml. 
c/ First digits are generated in MINITAB based on the fraud data provided by Hill (1998, p. 363) 
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